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Abstract. In this paper I give a brief introduction to a family of simple but non-
trivial models designed to increase our understanding of collective processes in markets,
the so-called Minority Games, and their non-equilibrium statistical mathematical
analysis. Since the most commonly studied members of this family define disordered
stochastic processes without detailed balance, the canonical technique for finding exact
solutions is found to be generating functional analysis a la De Dominicis, as originally
developed in the spin-glass community.
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1. Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) [1], a variation on the so-called El-Farol bar problem [2], was
designed to understand the cooperative phenomena observed in markets. It describes
agents who each make a binary decision at every point in time, e.g. whether to buy or
sell. Profit is made by those who find themselves in the minority group, i.e. who end
up buying when most wish to sell, or vice versa. The agents take their decisions on the
basis of an arsenal of individual ‘strategies’, from which each agent aims to select the
optimal one (i.e. the strategy that leads to the largest number of minority decisions).
The dynamic equations of the MG describe the stochastic evolution of these strategy
selections. Each agent wishes to make profit, but the net effect of his/her trading actions
is defined fully in terms of (or relative to) the actions taken by the other agents. Hence
the model has a significant amount of built-in frustration. Although in its simplest form
(as discussed in this paper) the MG is a crude simplification of real markets, there is
now also a growing number of more realistic MG spin-off models [3].
For the non-equilibrium statistical mechanicist the MG is an intriguing disordered
system. It has been found to exhibit non-trivial behaviour, e.g. dynamical phase
transitions separating an ergodic from a highly non-ergodic regime, and to pose a
considerable mathematical challenge. Its stochastic equations do not obey detailed
balance, so there is no equilibrium state and understanding the model requires solving
its dynamics. In this paper I first give an introduction to the properties and the early
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studies of the MG, seen through the eyes of a non-equilibrium statistical mechanicist.
The second part of the paper is a review of the more recent applications to the MG of
the generating functional analysis methods of De Dominicis [4]. These have led to exact
results in the form of closed macroscopic order parameter equations, and to clarification
of a number of unresolved issues and debates regarding the nature of the microscopic
laws and various previously proposed approximations.
2. Definitions and properties
We consider a community of N agents, labeled i = 1 . . . N (the ‘market’). At each
discrete iteration step ℓ each agent i must take a binary decision si(ℓ) ∈ {−1, 1} (e.g.
‘sell’ or ‘buy’). The agents make these decisions on the basis of public information I(ℓ)
which they are given at stage ℓ (state of the market, political developments, weather
forecasts, etc), which is taken from some finite discrete set Ω = {I1, . . . , Ip} of size
|Ω| = p. For future convenience we will also define the relative size α = p/N . Note
that all agents always receive the same information. Profit is made at iteration step ℓ
by those agents who find themselves in the minority group (by those who wish to buy
when most aim to sell, or vice versa), i.e. by those i for which si(ℓ)[
∑
j sj(ℓ)] < 0.
The actual conversion of the observation of I(ℓ) into the N trading decisions
{s1(ℓ), . . . , sN(ℓ)} is defined via so-called trading ‘strategies’, which are basically look-up
tables. Every agent i has S decision making strategies Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
p
ia) ∈ {−1, 1}p,
with a ∈ {1, . . . , S}. If strategy a is the one used by agent i at iteration step ℓ, and
the public information I(ℓ) is found to be I(ℓ) = Iµ(ℓ), then agent i will locate the
appropriate entry in the table Ria and take the decision
si(ℓ) = R
µ(ℓ)
ia (1)
Thus, given knowledge of the active strategies of all N agents, the responses of all agents
to the arrival of public information are fully deterministic.
What remains in defining the model is giving a recipe for deciding the choice of
decision strategy Ria from the arsenal of S possibilities as a function of time, for all
agents. This is done as follows. The agents aim to select or discover profitable strategies
within their arsenals, by keeping track of the strategies’ performance in the market. A
strategy Ria is profitable for agent i at stage ℓ of the game (i.e. it puts agent i in the
minority group) if and only if R
µ(ℓ)
ia = −sgn[
∑
j sj(ℓ)]. Hence we can measure for each
agent i the cumulative performance of strategy Ria by a quantity pia, which is updated
at every stage ℓ of the game according to
pia(ℓ+ 1) = pia(ℓ)− η
N
R
µ(ℓ)
ia
∑
j
sj(ℓ) (2)
with η > 0 (the scaling factor N is introduced for future mathematical convenience).
Each agent i now chooses at every stage ℓ of the game the strategy aiℓ which has the
best cumulative performance pia(ℓ) at that point in time.
In summary, upon insertion of (1) into (2) and given the external information stream
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Figure 1. Dependence of the volatility σ on the re-scaled size α = p/N of the external
information set Ω. The markers refer to numerical simulations following different initial
conditions (whose details will be explained later), with S = 2 (two strategies per agent)
and N = 4000. The value σ = 1 would have been obtained for purely random decision
making.
defined by {µ(ℓ)}, the dynamics of the MG is defined fully by the following two coupled
non-linear equations for the evolving strategy performance measures {pia} (with A(ℓ)
giving the total market bid at stage ℓ):
pia(ℓ+ 1) = pia(ℓ)− η
N
R
µ(ℓ)
ia A(ℓ) A(ℓ) =
∑
j
R
µ(ℓ)
jaj(ℓ)
(3)
ai(ℓ) = arg maxa∈{1,...,S}pia(ℓ) (4)
In the original model [1] the information µ(ℓ) was defined as a deterministic function
of the macroscopic market history, i.e. of the terms A(ℓ′) =
∑
j sj(ℓ
′) =
∑µ(ℓ′)
jRjaj(ℓ′)
with
ℓ′ < ℓ: µ(ℓ) = K[A(ℓ − 1), A(ℓ− 2), . . .], for some function K[. . .]. In this formulation
the process (3,4) is fully deterministic but non-local in time. Furthermore, there is
quenched disorder (the realization of the look-up tables {Ri}) and a large degree of
built-in competition and frustration.
The main quantity of interest to those caring about real markets is the so-called
volatility, the measure of macroscopic market fluctuations. In the present model the
appropriate object is the re-scaled and time-averaged variance σ2 of the total bid A(ℓ)
(since the time-averaged expectation value of the total bid is zero):
σ2 = lim
τ→∞
1
τN
τ∑
ℓ=1
A2(ℓ) (5)
This quantity was found in simulations to depend in a nontrivial way on the relative
size α of the set Ω, similar to e.g. Figure 1, which seemed to suggest to agents the
possibility of market prediction (since random decision making corresponds to σ = 1)
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and to theorists the presence of a non-equilibrium phase transition. Since simulations
also indicated that the behaviour of the volatility did not depend qualitatively on the
value of S (the number of strategies per agent, provided this number remains finite as
N →∞), most of the research has concentrated on the simplest nontrivial case S = 2.
Here it is possible to reduce the dimensionality of the problem further upon defining
qi =
pi1 − pi2
2
, ξµi =
Rµi1 −Rµi2
2
, Ωµ =
∑
j[R
µ
j1 +R
µ
j2]
2
√
N
(6)
We can now write the process (3,4) in the deceivingly compact form
qi(ℓ+ 1) = qi(ℓ)− η√
N
ξ
µ(ℓ)
i

Ωµ(ℓ) + 1√
N
∑
j
ξ
µ(ℓ)
j sgn[qj(ℓ)]

 (7)
which in the standard MG is non-local in time due to the dependence of µ(ℓ) =
K[A(ℓ− 1), A(ℓ− 2), . . .] (with A(ℓ′) = ∑j sgn[qj(ℓ′)]) on the past of the system.
3. Early studies and generalizations
The first major step forward after the MG’s introduction in [1] was [5], where it was
shown that the volatility σ remains largely unchanged if, instead of being calculated
from the true market history, the variables µ(ℓ) are simply drawn at random from
{1, . . . , αN} (at every iteration step ℓ, independently and with equal probabilities).
Apparently the agents are not predicting the market: the observed phenomena are the
result of complex collective processes, which depend only on all agents responding to
the same information (whether correct or nonsensical). The mathematical consequences
of having the numbers µ(ℓ) drawn at random, however, are profound: the equations (7)
now describe a disordered Markov process (without detailed balance) and analysis comes
within reach. In [6] it was shown that the relevant quantities studied in the MG can be
scaled such that they become independent of the number of agents N when this number
becomes very large. An interesting generalization of the game was the introduction of
agents’ decision noise [7], which was shown not only to improve worse than random
behaviour but also, more surprisingly, to be able to make it better than random‡. In
[10] one finds the first observation in the MG of the so-called ‘frozen agents’. These
are agents for which asymptotically qi(ℓ) ∼ ℓ (ℓ → ∞), in the language of (7), and
who in view of the definition qi =
1
2
[pi1 − pi2] will eventually end up always playing the
same strategy. The four papers [5, 6, 7, 10] more or less paved the way for statistical
mechanical theory.
The first attempt at solution of the MG is found in [11, 12], whose authors studied
the MG with decision noise and argued that for N → ∞, and after appropriate
temporal course-graining, one is allowed to neglect the fluctuations in sgn[qi(ℓ) + zi(ℓ)]
and concentrate on the expectation values mi(ℓ) =
∫
dz P (z)sgn[qi(ℓ) + z]. In terms
of the re-scaled time t = ℓ/N the authors then derived deterministic equations in
‡ Using a phenomenological theory for the volatility, based on so-called ‘crowd-anticrowd’ cancellations
this effect was partially explained in [8, 9].
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the limit N → ∞, of the form dmi(t)/dt = fi[m(t)], which were shown to have a
Lyapunov function. This allowed for a ground state analysis using equilibrium statistical
mechanics, in combination with standard replica theory [13] to carry out the disorder
average (based on the introduction of a fictitious temperature which is sent to zero after
having taken the limits N → ∞ and n → 0, where n denotes the replica dimension,
similar to e.g. [14]). The authors of [11, 12] found a phase transition at α ↓ αc ≈ 0.33740
(in agreement with simulation evidence, see e.g. Figure 1), but ran into mathematical
difficulties for α < αc.
The authors of [11, 12] then initiated a discussion [15, 16] about the validity of the
assumptions in [11, 12] and the reliability of the simulations in [7]. Following a further
study [17], in which a Fokker-Planck equation was derived for the MG (and solved
numerically), and where fluctuations were claimed not to be negligible, this discussion
appeared to be put to rest in [18] with the conclusions that the simulations of [7] had not
yet equilibrated (acknowledged already in [16]), and that the microscopic fluctuations
in the MG can not be neglected after all (except perhaps in special cases). It should
be noted, however, that the microscopic definitions of [7, 16, 17] are different from
those of [11, 15, 18]. This state of affairs was unsatisfactory: there was still no exact
solution of the MG (whether for statics or dynamics), the status of the assumptions and
approximations made by the various authors remained unclear, in both [17] and [18]
Fokker-Planck equations are derived for the MG, but with different diffusion matrices,
and (finally) there were conflicting statements on the differences between multiplicative
and additive decision noise with regard to the volatility. Clearly, since the MG defines a
disordered stochastic process without detailed balance, the natural analytical approach
is to study its dynamics. In the remainder of this paper I show how the generating
functional techniques developed by De Dominicis [4] can be used to solve various versions
of the MG analytically. Full details of this analysis can be found in the trio [19, 20, 21].
4. Solution of the Batch MG
In order to circumvent the debates relating to the temporal course graining of the MG
process and concentrate fully on the disorder, the first generating functional analysis
study of the MG [19] was carried out for a modified so-called ‘batch’ version of the
model. Instead of the equations (7) (where state changes follow each randomly drawn
information index µ(ℓ)), in the batch MG the dynamics is defined directly in terms of
an average over all possible choices µ ∈ {1, . . . , αN} for the external information:
qi(ℓ+ 1) = qi(ℓ)− 1
αN
αN∑
µ=1
ξµi

Ωµ+ 1√N
∑
j
ξµj sgn[qj(ℓ)]

+ θi(ℓ)
(8)
Here we have also chosen η =
√
N (to ensure O(N0) characteristic time-scales for
the batch version of the MG). This defines a disordered deterministic map, since the
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stochasticity has now been removed. An external force θi(ℓ) was added in order to define
response functions later.
Generating functional analysis a la De Dominicis [4] is based on evaluation of the
following disorder-averaged§ generating functional:
Z [ψ] =
〈
e
−i
∑N
i=1
∑
t≥0
ψi(t)qi(t)
〉
(9)
From this object one can obtain the main disorder-averaged quantities of interest, such
as individual averages, multiple-time covariances, and response functions, e.g.
〈qi(ℓ)〉 = lim
ψ→0
i∂Z [ψ]
∂ψi(ℓ)
(10)
〈qi(ℓ)qj(ℓ′)〉 = − lim
ψ→0
∂2Z [ψ]
∂ψi(ℓ)∂ψj(ℓ′)
(11)
∂〈qi(ℓ)〉
∂θj(ℓ′)
= lim
ψ→0
i∂2Z [ψ]
∂ψi(ℓ)∂θj(ℓ′)
(12)
One next defines suitable (time-dependent) fields which must depend linearly on an
extensive number of the statistically independent disorder variables {Rµia}, and which
drive the dynamics (in spin-glass models these would have been the actual local magnetic
fields), such as xµ(ℓ) =
√
2/N
∑
i sgn[qi(ℓ)]ξ
µ
i . One then writes (9) as a sum (or integral)
over all possible paths taken by these fields. In practice this is done via the insertion
into (9) of integrals over appropriate δ-distributions, e.g. of
1 =
αN∏
µ=1
∏
ℓ≥0
{∫
dxµ(ℓ) δ
[
xµ(ℓ)−
√
2√
N
∑
i
sgn[qi(ℓ)]ξ
µ
i
]}
(13)
This procedure is carried out until all disorder variables have been concentrated into
such fields; here this requires further fields in addition to the xµ(ℓ). Upon writing the δ-
functions in expressions such as (13) in integral form, the independent disorder variables
{Rµia} will all occur linearly in exponents, so that the disorder average can be carried
out. At the end one finds an expression involving an integral over all possible values of
the single-site correlation and response functions
Ctt′ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈sgn[qi(t)]sgn[qi(t′)]〉 (14)
Gtt′ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂
∂θi(t′)
〈sgn[qi(t)]〉 (15)
and a further set of related order parameter kernels {Cˆtt′ , Gˆtt′ , Ltt′ , Lˆtt′}:
Z [ψ] =
∫
DCDCˆDGDGˆDLDLˆ eNΨ[C,Cˆ,G,Gˆ,L,Lˆ] (16)
§ Disorder averaging will be denoted as [. . .]. The disorder is in the variables ξµi and Ωµ, see the
definitions (6), with µ ∈ {1, . . . , αN} and with each of the 2αN2 strategy table entries Rµia drawn
independently at random from {−1, 1} with equal probabilities.
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Figure 2. The persistent covariance c = limt→∞ C(t) (left picture) and the fraction φ
of frozen agents (right picture) in the stationary state. The markers are obtained from
individual simulation runs, with N = 4000 and various homogeneous initial conditions
(where qi(0) = q(0) ∀i), measured after 1000 iteration steps. The solid curves to
the right of the critical point (vertical dashed line in each picture) are the theoretical
predictions, given by the solution of (20,21). The dotted curves to the left of the critical
point are their continuations into the α < αc regime (where they should no longer be
correct).
with the abbreviation DC ≡ ∏tt′≥0 dCtt′ , and with Ψ[. . .] = O(N0). In the limit N →∞
the integral in (16) is evaluated by steepest descent, giving closed dynamical equations
for the kernels {C, Cˆ, G, Gˆ, L, Lˆ}, from which {Cˆ, Gˆ, L, Lˆ} can be eliminated. This
leaves a theory described by closed equations for C and G only, which turns out to
describe an effective stochastic ‘single agent’ process of the form
q(t+ 1) = q(t) + θ(t)− α∑
t′≤t
[1I +G]−1tt′ sgn[q(t
′)] +
√
α η(t) (17)
In (17) one has a retarded self-interaction and a zero-average Gaussian noise η(t) with
〈η(t)η(t′)〉 =
[
(1I +G)−1D(1I +G†)−1
]
tt′
Dtt′ = 1 + Ctt′ (18)
The equations from which to solve the two kernels {C,G} self-consistently are defined
in terms of the non-Markovian single-agent process (17,18) as follows: for all t, t′ ∈ IN
Ctt′ = 〈sgn[q(t)]sgn[q(t′)]〉, Gtt′ = ∂
∂θ(t′)
〈sgn[q(t)]〉 (19)
Finding the general solution of (19) analytically is extremely hard; one has to restrict
oneself in practice to working out the first few time steps, to stationary solutions, or to
numerical solution.
If, for instance, one investigates asymptotic stationary solutions of the form
Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and Gtt′ = G(t − t′), and furthermore assumes absence of anomalous
response (i.e. a finite value for the integrated response χ =
∑
t>0G(t)) it is not difficult
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Figure 3. Evidence for the existence of a critical initial strategy valuation qc(0) below
which a high-volatility solution σ ∼ α−1/2 (α→ 0) exists. Connected markers show the
results of individual simulations, with N = 4000 and homogeneous initial conditions
qi(0) = q(0) ∀i, measured after 1000 iteration steps. The data are compatible with the
prediction qc(0) ≈ 0.242 (dashed line).
[19] to obtain an exact closed equation for the persistent correlation c = limt→∞C(t):
c = 1− (1− 1 + c
α
) erf
[√
α
2(1 + c)
]
−
√
2(1 + c)
πα
e−
α
2(1+c) . (20)
from which c follows as a function of the parameter α. Similarly one can find exact
expressions for the fraction φ of ‘frozen’ agents and for the integrated response χ:
φ = 1− erf[
√
α/2(1 + c)] (21)
χ = (1− φ)/(α− 1 + φ) (22)
For α → ∞ one finds limα→∞ c = limα→∞ φ = limα→∞ χ = 0. It follows from (22)
that the assumption χ < ∞ underlying (20,21,22) breaks down when α = 1 − φ. This
defines a critical value αc signaling the onset of non-ergodicity, which can be calculated
in combination with (21), giving αc ≈ 0.33740 (the same value obtained earlier in
[11, 12]). The results of solving (20) and (21) numerically, as a function of α, are shown
in Figure 2. One observes perfect agreement with simulations for α > αc, and, as
expected, disagreement and ergodicity breaking for α < αc (where the condition χ <∞
is violated). The volatility is found not to be a natural order parameter of the MG (nor
expressible directly in terms of the solution of (20,21), not even for α > αc; its calculation
required approximations, resulting in Figure 1 (shown together with simulation results
of the same specifications as those in Figure 2).
It should be emphasized that for α < αc the macroscopic equations (17,18,19)
are still exact; finding their stationary solutions analytically, however, is much more
difficult. Some of the results which have been obtained for the α < αc regime, for
instance, are scaling properties of solutions for α → 0 (shown in Figure 1). Low
volatility solutions σ ∼ α 12 (α → 0) are found following initial conditions with large
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|qi(0)|, whereas high-volatility solutions with σ ∼ α− 12 (α → 0) are found following
initial conditions with small |qi(0)|. Upon making some simple approximations one can
also calculate an expression for the critical initial value for the |qi(0)|, qc(0) ≈ 0.242,
bordering the region of existence of the high-volatility solution, see Figure 3.
5. Solution of the Batch MG with decision noise
The Batch MG with decision noise is obtained upon making in (8) the replacement
sgn[qi(t)] → σ[qi(ℓ), zi(ℓ)|Ti], with the {zi(ℓ)} representing zero-average and unit-
variance identically distributed and independent random variables. The parameters
Ti ≥ 0 measure the noise levels of the individual agents. The function σ[. . . |T ] obeys
σ[q, z|T ] ∈ {−1, 1}, σ[q, z|0] = sgn[q] (for T → 0 we return to the previous model) and∫
dz P (z)σ[q, z|∞] = 0 (T →∞ implies purely random decisions). Examples are
additive noise : σ[q, z|T ] = sgn[q + Tz] (23)
multiplicative noise : σ[q, z|T ] = sgn[q] sgn[1 + Tz] (24)
The deterministic equations (8) are thus replaced by the following stochastic ones:
qi(ℓ+ 1) = qi(ℓ)− 1
αN
αN∑
µ=1
ξµi

Ωµ + 1√N
∑
j
ξµj σ[qj(ℓ), zj(ℓ)|Tj]

+ θi(ℓ)
(25)
The analytical procedure outlined for the previous model (8) is adapted quite easily
to its generalization (25). Again one finds, in the limit N → ∞, closed equations for
the disorder-averaged correlation and response functions (14,15), describing an effective
stochastic ‘single agent’ process:
q(t+ 1) = q(t) + θ(t)− α∑
t′≤t
[1I +G]−1tt′ σ[q(t
′), z(t′)|T ] +√α η(t)
(26)
(parametrized by a noise strength T , so that we must denote averages henceforth as
〈. . .〉T ). The covariances of the zero-average Gaussian noise η(t) are still given by (18);
the independent random variables {z(t)} are distributed exactly as the site-variables
{zi(ℓ)} in (25). The order parameter equations (19) are now found to be replaced by
Ctt′ =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T ) 〈sgn[q(t)]sgn[q(t′)]〉T (27)
Gtt′ =
∫ ∞
0
dT W (T )
∂
∂θ(t′)
〈sgn[q(t)]〉T (28)
with the distribution of noise strengths
W (T ) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ[T − Ti] (29)
Making the choiceW (T ) = δ(T ) (i.e. deterministic decision making) immediately brings
us back to (17,18,19), as it should.
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Figure 4. Transition lines for the Batch MG with multiplicative decision noise
(24), P (z) = (2π)−1/2e−z
2/2, and W (T ′) = ǫδ[T ′ − T ] + (1 − ǫ)δ[T ′] with ǫ ∈
{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} (from right to left). Each line is defined by the condition
χ ≡ ∑t>0G(t) = ∞ and separates a non-ergodic phase (to the left) from an ergodic
phase (to the right). For additive noise our theory predicts the T -independent (vertical)
line, i.e. the ǫ = 0 curve, for any choice of W (T ).
In the present model one can as before calculate stationary solutions without
anomalous response, and calculate order parameters such as c and φ as a function of α
and the distribution W (T ), and for different types of decision noise. A phase transition
to a highly non-ergodic state will again be marked by χ ≡ ∑t>0G(t) =∞. Here I restrict
myself to showing phase diagrams for some simple choices, see Figure 4. The theory
reveals that, in the ergodic regime, for additive decision noise (23) the location of the
χ = ∞ transition is completely independent of W (T )‖; the same is true for the values
of the order parameters c and φ. Calculating the solution of equations (26,18,27,28)
for the first few time-steps [20] also reveals the mechanism of how the introduction of
decision noise can indeed have the counter-intuitive effect (observed already in [7]) of
reducing the market volatility σ, by damping global oscillations.
6. Solution of the On-line Minority Game
Having carried out the generating functional analysis of the two previous batch versions
of the MG (with S = 2, and with deterministic or noisy decision making), the obviouys
next step is to return to the original (more complicated) dynamics (7) where state
changes followed individual presentations of external information, but now generalized
‖ The explanation for this seems to be that the χ =∞ transition is determined purely by the properties
of the ‘frozen agents’. These agents, for which qi(ℓ) ∼ ℓ as ℓ → ∞ will asymtotically always overrule
the noise term in (23). In contrast, for multiplicative noise (24) the noise will retain the potential to
change decisions, even for ‘frozen’ agents.
Non-equilibrium statistical mechanics of Minority Games 11
to include decision noise:
qi(ℓ+ 1) = qi(ℓ)− η√
N
ξ
µ(ℓ)
i

Ωµ(ℓ) + 1√N
∑
j
ξ
µ(ℓ)
j σ[qj(ℓ), zj(ℓ)]

+ θi(ℓ)
(30)
The µ(ℓ) are drawn randomly and independently from {1, . . . , αN}, introducing a second
element of stochasticity on top of the decision making noise variables {zj(ℓ)}. However,
the individual (noisy) updates are now small (O(N− 12 ), so for N →∞ we may attempt
a continuous-time description. This switch to continuous time (in particular: whether
upon doing so the fluctuations can be taken as Gaussian, or even be discarged) was the
subject of the discussion in [15, 16] and subsequent papers.
The temporal regularization problem can be resolved using a procedure described
in [22]. The idea is to link the process (30) to a continuous time one by defining random
durations for each of the iterations in (30), distributed according to
Prob
[
ℓ steps at time t ∈ IR+
]
=
1
ℓ!
[
t
∆N
]ℓ
e−t/∆N
The parameter ∆N gives the average real-time duration of a single iteration of (30).
Upon writing the Markov process (30) in probabilistic form¶,
pℓ+1(q) =
∫
dq′ W (q|q′)pℓ(q′) (31)
we find the new continuous-time process to be defined as
d
dt
pt(q) =
1
∆N
{ ∫
dq′ W (q|q′)pt(q′)− pt(q)
}
(32)
The price paid is uncertainty about where one is on the time axis. This uncertainty,
however, will vanish if we choose ∆N → 0 for N → ∞. Upon studying the scaling
properties with N of the process (32) via the Kramers-Moyal expansion, for the kernel
W (q|q′) corresponding to (30), one can establish the following facts:
• The correct scaling for the parameters ∆N and η is: ∆N = O(N−1), η = O(N0)
• As N →∞ one obtains a Fokker-Planck equation for individual components qi:
d
dt
pt(qi) =
∂
∂qi
[pt(qi)Fi(qi, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂q2i
[pt(qi)Di(qi, t)] +O( 1√
N
)
• The process for q = (q1, . . . , qN), however, cannot for N → ∞ be described by
a Fokker-Planck equation (non-Gaussian fluctuations in the qi cannot a priori be
discarged; although small, they might conspire for an N -component system).
Working out the diffusion matrix Dij(q) of the full process, for additive decision noise
(23), for comparison with previous results in [17] and [18] (where the MG was claimed
to obey a Fokker-Planck equation), reveals that Dij(q) = D
A
ij(q) +D
B
ij(q), where
DAij(q) =
1
N
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j

Ωµ + 1√
N
∑
j
ξµj tanh(βqj)


2
(33)
¶ We leave aside the external fields for now, which only serve to define response functions.
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DBij(q) =
1
N2
p∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j
∑
k
(ξµk )
2
[
1− tanh2(βqk)
]
(34)
The term DAij(q) mainly describes fluctuations due to the randomly drawn indices µ(ℓ);
DBij(q) reflects mainly the fluctuations generated by decision noise. Comparison shows
that the diffusion matrices given in [17] and [18] are both approximations.
Having resolved the temporal regularization, one can now proceed to analyze
the MG upon adapting to continuous time each of the generating functional analysis
steps taken for the batch MG models (upon adding external fields). Since we choose
∆N = O(N−1) the impact of studying (32) rather than (31) (i.e. the uncertainty of our
clock) is guaranteed to vanish as N →∞. The disorder-averaged generating functional
is now a path integral:
Z [ψ] =
〈
e−i
∑
i
∫
dt ψi(t)qi(t)
〉
(35)
Accepting the potential technical problems associated with steepest descent integration
for path-integrals (which here imply additional assumptions on the smoothness of the
correlation- and response functions), one can adapt the batch procedures, take the limit
N →∞, and find again an effective ‘single agent’ process:
d
dt
q(t) = θ(t)− α
∫ t
0
dt′ R(t, t′) 〈σ[q(t′), z]〉z +
√
α η(t) (36)
The retarded self-interaction kernel is given by
R(t, t′) = δ(t− t′) +∑
ℓ>0
(−1)ℓ(Gℓ)(t, t′) (37)
(i.e. the continuous-time equivalent of the previous [1I+G]−1, written as a power series),
whereas the zero-average Gaussian noise η(t) is here characterized by
〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = ∑
ℓℓ′≥0
(−1)ℓ+ℓ′
∫ ∞
0
ds1 . . . dsℓds
′
1 . . . ds
′
ℓ′
∏
uv
[
1 +
1
2
η δ(su − s′v)
]
×G(s0, s2) . . . G(sℓ−1, sℓ)[1 + C(sℓ, s′ℓ]G†(s′ℓ, s′ℓ−1) . . .G†(s′1, s′0) (38)
(which would only for η = 0 be a continuous-time version of previous expressions). The
order parameter kernels C and G are to be solved from
C(t, t′) = 〈〈σ[q(t), z]〉z〈σ[q(t′), z]〉z〉 (39)
G(t, t′) =
δ
δθ(t′)
〈〈σ[q(t), z]〉z〉 (40)
The closed macroscopic equations (36,37,38,39,40) for the original so-called on-line
MG with random external information (in the limit N → ∞) are claimed to be exact
for any α and any type of decision noise. Although they are again not easily solved in
general, they have clarified many of the debates and apparent contradictions in previous
studies. More specifically, they reveal that
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• The ergodic stationary state in the regime α > αc(T ), which is calculated easily,
is independent of η, and consequently identical to that of the batch MG and the
replica solution in [11, 12]. For α < αc(T ), however, this is no longer the case:
batch and on-line MG dynamics are now truly different. Previous methods had not
yet succeeded in producing exact macroscopic laws for this regime.
• Premature truncation of the Kramers-Moyal expansion after the diffusion term
(leading to a Fokker-Planck equation), provided with the correct diffusion matrix
(i.e. neither of the ones proposed so far), would for N →∞ have led to the correct
macroscopic equations. Apparently, the natural order parameters of the problem
are not sensitive to the weak non-Gaussian fluctuations.
7. Discussion
Minority Games are a specific class of disordered stochastic systems without detailed
balance. In this contribution I have tried to give a (biased) introduction to their
definitions, properties, and non-equilibrium statistical mechanical theories. I claim that
the generating functional analysis techniques proposed by De Dominicis [4] (which allow
for the derivation of exact, closed macroscopic dynamic equations in the limit N →∞)
are the canonical tools with which to study these systems, both (a priori) in view of
the specific nature of the MGs as statistical mechanical systems and (retrospectively) in
view of the insight and clarification which application of these techniques have already
generated. Compared to some of the other methods in the disordered systems arena,
generating functional analysis is immediately seen to be in principle mathematically
sound. As always in applied areas, one should worry about the existence of limits
and integrals, but these are quite conventional reservations (in contrast to e.g. replica
theory); the only serious step is the application of saddle-point arguments in path
integrals (for the on-line MG), but, again, this is a familiar type of worry in statistical
mechanics about which much has already been written.
In addition the generating functional analysis methods have opened the door to
many interesting new questions which can now start to be addressed. At the level
of increasing realism, one could re-introduce multiple strategies (S > 2), increase
the agents’ decision range (e.g. to σ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, representing the options buy,
inactivity, or sell), inspect slowly evolving strategy tables, consider the trading of
multiple commodities, introduce capital and trading costs, etc. This is perhaps not
likely to generate fundamentally new mathematical puzzles, but would make MGs more
relevant to those interested in markets as such, and thereby promote the power of non-
equilibrium statistical mechanics in a wider community.
At the mathematical level one could now assess the precise impact of replacing the
true market memory by random numbers in the definition of the external information
(there is simulation evidence that for α < αc there might be non-negligible differences
after all). In replica approaches this would be nearly impossible (since it renders the
model again non-Markovian), but within the generating functional framework (where
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one already finds a non-Markovian effective ‘single agent’ anyway) there appear to be
no fundamental obstacles. Secondly, one could try (for the batch and on-line versions)
to construct or approximate further solutions of the macroscopic equations in the non-
ergodic regime α < αc. Thirdly, the generating functional equations reveal that many
of the approximations which have been used in the past to calculate the volatility σ boil
down to assuming the existence of non-equilibrium Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorems in
the stationary state. It would be interesting to investigate more generally the existence
and nature of such identities relating the correlation and response functions for models
such as the MG, where (in contrast to e.g. spin-glasses) detailed balance violations
are built-in microscopically, rather than emerging only in the N → ∞ limit. Any
new results concerning such identities would have considerable implications for a wider
area of non-equilibrium systems, including e.g. non-symmetric neural networks, cellular
automata, and immune system networks.
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